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Abstract Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to
attain because of strong free-rider incentives. This paper explores how different technology
spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentives to join and stabilise an
international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us
to investigate the stability of partial climate coalitions. Several theories on the impact of
technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We
find that spillovers are a good instrument to increase the abatement efforts of coalitions and
reduce the associated costs. In our setting, however, they cannot overcome the strong
free-rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions, i.e. technology spillovers do not
substantially increase the success of international environmental agreements. This
conclusion is robust with respect to the specification of technology spillovers.
Keywords Climate change modelling  International environmental agreements 
Non-cooperative game theory  Technology spillovers
1 Introduction
Successful CO2 emission abatement requires international cooperation. However, full
cooperation in the international environmental agreements (IEAs) seems to be difficult to
achieve because of free-riding incentives. Game theoretic approaches are widely used to
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explore the properties of IEAs. For example, Barrett (1994) proves that stable coalitions
will achieve little if the difference between the non-cooperative outcome and the full-
cooperative outcome for each region is large. In order to solve this problem, numerous
studies examine the effects of institutional settings aimed to stimulate voluntary partici-
pation in the IEAs, for example, through transfers (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Bloch
1997; Hoel and Schneider 1997; and Weikard et al. 2006). A general observation from this
literature is that rather inefficient partial coalitions tend to emerge and the coalition with all
the members may not be attained. De Zeeuw (2008) widens the scope to a dynamic context
and confirms that large stable coalitions can only emerge when the gains from cooperation
are small. Thus, even with transfers, full cooperation on emission abatement is hard to
establish.
The purpose of this paper is to systematically investigate how various technology
spillover mechanisms affect the formation and stability of climate coalitions in a non-
cooperative game. To do this, we use an integrated assessment model, STACO (Finus et al.
2006; Nagashima et al. 2006). We explore how technology spillovers that depend on the
coalition that is formed influence the incentive structures to join the coalition. Moreover,
we examine whether the effects of technology spillovers are large enough to stabilise more
ambitious coalitions by offsetting the incentive to free-ride. We simulate several spillover
mechanisms and specifications that are available in the literature to investigate the
robustness of these links.
The paper is organised as follows. The remainder of this section sketches the main
insights from the literature on technology cooperation and coalition formation. Section 2
provides the game theoretic and empirical framework of the STACO model, and introduces
technology spillovers in the model. Section 3 reports the main results with technology
spillovers, followed by an analysis of the impact of the level and direction of spillovers
between coalition members and to outsiders in Sect. 4. Section 5 provides an analysis of
alternative specifications of technology, and Sect. 6 concludes. The Appendix provides the
model parameter values.
1.1 Technology and coalition formation
It has been commonly recognised that technological change plays a significant role in
controlling climate change costs. In traditional neoclassical models, technological change
is determined exogenously, where it increases factor productivity (e.g. for analytical
studies, Arrow et al. 1961, Kennedy 1962 and Uzawa 1965, and for empirical studies, Peck
and Teisberg 1994; Nordhaus 1994 and Nordhaus and Yang 1996). New growth theory
places more emphasis on the endogenous role of technology and its positive externalities
that drive economic growth (Romer 1990, Griliches 1992, and Grossman and Helpman
1994). Endogenous technological change can be measured in different ways (see Weyant
and Olavson (1999) and Lo¨schel (2002) for excellent surveys in the domain of climate
change modelling). Lo¨schel (2002) and Clark et al. (2008) present three main factors in
endogenous technological change models: (1) research and development (R&D) invest-
ment, (2) technology spillovers (between countries, industries or firms) and (3) learning-
by-doing.
In this paper, we focus on the role of technology spillovers between countries (cf. Coe
and Helpman 1995) for the success of international climate agreements. As our framework
is a cost–benefit analysis of climate policy, technology spillovers are not derived from
R&D investment, but they are treated as factors that lead to cost reductions stemming from
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the level of knowledge in other regions.1 In short, technology spillovers depend on the
‘state of technology’ to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In the domain of coalition formation, a number of studies have proposed to link the
agreements on emissions abatement with technological cooperation. The main idea of this
mechanism is that each region negotiates not only on emission abatement but also nego-
tiates on technological cooperation, which might induce regions to join a coalition. For
example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994), Cesar and De Zeeuw (1996) and Barrett (2003)
indicate that linkage of the IEAs on climate control and technological cooperation may
stabilise an IEA, as payoffs of signatories will increase due to increased technological
spillovers from other signatories. Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) show that linkage of the
environmental agreement with an agreement on technological cooperation may overcome
free-riding problems due to the fact that the negotiation on both climate control and
technology is more profitable to signatories when benefits from technological cooperation
are exclusive to them than the negotiation on climate control only. Tol et al. (2000, 2001)
investigate the diffusion of abatement technology and argue that when diffusion can be
restricted to coalition members, this may reduce free-rider incentives, although countries
prefer to cooperate only on technology and not on abatement. Kemfert (2004) shows in an
applied coalition formation game with four regions that signatories can profit more when
they cooperate on emission abatement and technological innovation than in the case of
non-cooperation. Furthermore, there exist incentives for non-cooperating countries, such as
U.S.A., to join an agreement in which countries cooperate both on emission abatement and
technological innovations, because they can obtain technology spillovers, which improve
energy efficiency through trade in goods with signatories; international trade effects are
further investigated in Kemfert et al. (2004).
Buonanno et al. (2003) define the international spillovers of knowledge generated by a
stock of world knowledge. In their setting, international knowledge spillovers affect both
the production function and the emission to output ratio. Golombek and Hoel (2005)
assume that the technology level of the region depends on own investments in R&D and
R&D investment in other countries (signatories) using a certain rate of technology diffu-
sion, and R&D activities in cooperating countries will lower abatement costs in non-
cooperating countries due to technology diffusion. Bosetti et al. (2007) have recently taken
up this issue in an applied setting, using the multi-regional endogenous growth model
WITCH.
Buchner and Carraro (2005a, b, 2006) explore the interactions between technology and
coalition formation using the FEEM-RICE model. While their analysis touches upon the
same topic as ours, they focus on a subset of possible coalitions and investigate stability
issues only for those. This means that they cannot show the general implications of
technology spillovers on coalition formation nor address which regions will participate in
the most ambitious stable coalitions.
Most existing models assume that the level of environmental technology can be
approximated by looking at the emission intensity of production, that knowledge can be
aggregated over regions through summation and that spillovers have the effect of pivoting
the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve down. Recent literature suggests, however, that
a ‘best-shot’ aggregation of technology may be more appropriate (Sandler 2006). Fur-
thermore, alternative indicators of technology, based on for example energy intensity or
carbon intensity, are also found in the applied literature (e.g. Kemfert 2004). Finally, Baker
1 Growth theory considers spillovers as positive externalities, while innovation theory does not. For a
detailed discussion, see Weyant and Olavson (1999).
Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions 345
123
et al. (2008) and Bauman et al. (2008) challenge the conventional specification that
spillovers (or learning, for that matter) pivot down the MAC curves. Baker et al. (2008)
suggest two alternatives: an extension of the MAC curve to the right, and a change in the
curvature of the MAC curve.
The general insight that emerges from these studies is that there are a number of
different channels through which technology spillovers may affect the payoffs of regions
and thus the incentives to cooperate: (i) global spillovers from a ‘world stock of knowl-
edge’, (ii) spillovers that are directly derived from participation in the agreement
(coalitional spillovers) and (iii) spillovers to outsiders. Furthermore, technology spillovers
can be specified in different ways, depending on the answer to the essential questions of
how to measure technology and how to specify the effects of spillovers on the MAC curve.
What all these studies lack, however, is a systematic analysis of the influence of
technology spillovers on the stability of international climate agreements with hetero-
geneous players in an applied setting. Moreover, these studies do not shed light on the
influence of the relative magnitude of spillovers between coalition members versus
spillovers to outsiders, which can be a significant element for the success of climate
coalitions.
2 The stability of coalitions model (STACO)
2.1 Game theoretic background
In this section, we describe the game theoretic model. Our analysis uses a two-stage, one
shot game. In the first stage, regions denoted by i 2 N;N ¼ 1; . . .; nf g decide whether they
sign the agreement or not. Signatories form a coalition and non-signatories remain
singletons in the second stage of the game. Then, all regions simultaneously determine
their emission abatement levels. The payoff for each region pi is a function of regional
benefits Bit and regional abatement costs ACit at period t. Formally, we have:
piðqÞ ¼
X1
t¼1
ð1 þ rÞt  ðBitðq1; . . .; qtÞ  ACitðqitÞÞ
  ð1Þ
where q is an abatement matrix of dimension N 9 ?, and r is the discount rate. The payoff
is calculated as the net present value (NPV) of the stream of net benefits. We assume that
the regional benefits depend on past and current global emission abatement, and the
regional abatement costs depend on a region’s own current abatement. The regional
abatement levels are determined within the abatement strategy space qit 2 0; eit½ ; where
eit denotes emission levels in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.
We apply the solution concept of a partial agreement Nash equilibrium between the
signatories and singletons (Chander and Tulkens 1995, 1997). We assume that signatories
determine their abatement level by maximising the sum of the payoffs of the signatories
taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. Non-signatories choose their
abatement level by maximising their own payoffs taking the other regions’ abatement
levels as given. This abatement game has a unique interior solution under the STACO
specification of benefit and cost functions (see Sect. 2.2).
We apply the optimal sharing rule developed by Carraro et al. (2006) and Weikard
(2008). Optimal sharing requires that each signatory obtains at least the payoff that can
be secured when it deviates from coalition K. This is called the outside option payoff.
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In addition, the residual is distributed in proportion to the outside option payoffs.2 Weikard
(2008) shows that surplus sharing according to outside option payoffs internally stabilises
all coalitions that are possibly stable under any sharing rule. That is, if the coalition payoff
is distributed in such a way that each member gets at least its outside-option payoff, then
no region has incentives to leave the coalition. Hence, the coalition is internally stable
whenever the coalition payoff (weakly) exceeds the sum of the outside option payoffs.
We refer to the situations where none or one of the regions joins a coalition as ‘All
Singletons’, and a coalition where all regions cooperate as ‘Grand Coalition’. Following
d’Aspremont et al. (1983), we call a coalition K stable if the coalition satisfies both internal
and external stability. Internal stability of a coalition means that no signatory has an
incentive to withdraw from the coalition. External stability of a coalition means that no
singleton has an incentive to join the coalition.
2.2 The STACO model
In this section, we present the main issues in the numerical specification of our model in a
dynamic setting described in Nagashima et al. (2006), which is an extension of the original
static STACO-1 model explained in Finus et al. (2006). We consider twelve world regions:
USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE),
Eastern European countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries
(EEX), China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and
rest of the world (ROW). Payoffs from abatement are given as the NPV of benefits minus
abatement costs over the model horizon. We set the model horizon to infinity to capture
future benefits from abatement, while adopting a planning horizon for abatement and
coalition formation of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110. Calibration of the regional
BAU emission paths,3 represented in the Appendix (Fig. A1), is based on the data for CO2
emissions derived from the EPPA model (Babiker et al. 2001; J. M. Reilly 2005, pers.
comm.) and the GDP path is also derived from the EPPA model. Our benefit function is
based on a linearised approximation of avoided damages, calculated by using the damage
module of the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994) and the climate module by Germain and van
Steenberghe (2003). For global damages, we apply the estimate by Tol (1997) that dam-
ages amount to 2.7% of GDP for a doubling of concentrations over pre-industrial levels.
Global benefits are allocated according to a fixed share for each region, as displayed in
Appendix (Table A2). We specify a regional abatement cost function based on the
estimates of the EPPA model by Ellerman and Decaux (1998).
2.3 Technology spillovers
In our base model, we adopt the (common) assumption that technology spills over to region i
in period t (1itÞ by reducing marginal abatement costs through pivoting of the MAC curve4:
MACi;tþ1 ¼ ð1  1i;tÞ  MACi;t ð2Þ
Or equivalently,
2 The residual can be shared by each coalition member in any way desired, because it does not affect
internal stability as long as these shares are non-negative.
3 We use data from World Bank (2003) to match the regional aggregation in EPPA to STACO.
4 We investigate alternative assumptions in Sect. 5.
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MACi;t  oACitoqit ¼ ai 
Yt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ
 !
 q2it þ bi 
Yt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ
 !
 qit; ð3Þ
where
Qt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ reflects the product of technological spillovers until period t, and a
and b are the abatement cost parameters in our base year 2010.
The size of the technology spillover depends on which regions are member of the coa-
lition. We assume that the spillovers will be higher when more regions are member of the
coalition, and when regions with an advanced state of technology are member of the coa-
lition, but the size of the spillover cannot be controlled by the coalition members, as their
state of technology is exogenous. Spillovers to region j in period t (1jtÞ are expressed through
a summation over all players of the regional spillover effect times the state of technology:
1jt ¼
XN
i¼1
nij  SoTit ð4Þ
with 0 nij\1 the spillover effect from region i to region j. In different scenarios, the value
of nij varies, depending on whether i and/or j are member of the coalition. Unfortunately,
there is no strong empirical base to calibrate the values of nij: Therefore, we conduct a
robustness analysis by changing the values of these spillover coefficients in Sect. 4.
The ‘state of technology’ (SoT) used in Eq. 4 is the inverse of the regional emission
intensity in the reference path, calculated as the business-as-usual amount of CO2 emission
per unit of GDP.5 The rationale for this definition is that regions that have low emission
intensities have a high level of knowledge on GHG abatement strategies. To investigate the
robustness of this definition, we compare some alternative definitions in Sect. 5. As we use
the state of technology as an indicator of the level of knowledge, we refer to the emission
intensity in the reference path and do not adjust for changes in the emission intensity due to
abatement. This is because we interpret abatement primarily as a movement along the
technology curve, i.e. adoption of existing knowledge, rather than a shift of the curve, i.e.
creation of new knowledge. As for the state of technology, Table 1 shows that Japan has
the highest state of technology throughout the century, followed by EU15. On the other
hand, U.S.A. and China have relatively low states of technology.
To investigate the role of spillovers on coalitional stability in a systematic manner, we
investigate five scenarios, which differ with respect to the type of spillover between regions.
In the first or reference scenario, we consider coalition formation in the absence of
technology spillovers, and do not assume any technological progress. We assume no
technology spillovers among regions: nij ¼ 0:
In the second scenario, we assume regional spillovers that depend only on the own state
of technology, i.e. internal spillovers. Therefore, we have nii ¼ nown [ 0;nij ¼ 0 8j 6¼ i:
Although we have no solid empirical basis for the size of this internal spillover, we assume
nown ¼ 0:01: As the regional state of technology will always be smaller than unity, this
implies technology spillovers of less than 1% per annum.
In the third scenario, we assume global spillovers, which mimics international spillovers
of knowledge generated by ‘the stock of world knowledge’ as in Buonanno et al. (2003),
although our model is much simpler and thus cannot capture the knowledge creation
aspect. We rather focus on the link between technology spillovers and incentives to
cooperate in an IEA. In this context, the essence of the global spillovers is that every region
5 We scale the SoTs such that global SoT equals 1 in 2110.
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obtains technology spillovers, irrespective of membership of the coalition or not: nij ¼
nglobal [ 0: We assume that this global spillover replaces the internal spillover from sce-
nario 2 (nown ¼ 0Þ: Assuming the same spillover rate, that is, nglobal ¼ 0:01; leads to
technological progress slowly increasing over the century to 1% per annum.
In the fourth scenario, in addition to the global spillovers, signatories to the climate
agreement gain spillovers from the other coalition members (cf. the ‘coalition information
exchange parameter’ in Carraro and Siniscalco 1997); this scenario also refers to the
mechanism in Kemfert (2004) that participants cooperate on technological innovation.
With coalitional spillovers, in addition to global spillovers, signatories can obtain higher
spillovers from other signatories, that is,
nij ¼ nC þ nglobal [ 0 8i; j 2 K;
nij ¼ nglobal [ 0 else:
8
<
:
We calibrate coalitional spillovers to nC = 0.005 and still nglobal = 0.01.
This scenario is expected to provide a stimulus for regions to join a coalition, as
membership brings technology benefits, although the effect is assumed to be moderate, as
it is on top of the global spillover effect.
In the fifth scenario, following Golombek and Hoel (2005), we consider all possible
technology spillovers, i.e. we extend the mechanism of the third scenario with spillovers to
singletons (which we label ‘extended spillovers’). In this setting, not only signatories
benefit from internal coalition spillovers, but also singletons can obtain spillovers from
signatories, that is
nij ¼ nC þ nglobal [ 0 8i; j 2 K;
nij ¼ nNC þ nglobal [ 0 8i 2 K; 8j 62 K;
nij ¼ nglobal [ 0 else;
8
>><
>>:
where extended spillovers (nNCÞequal 0.001 and still nC = 0.005 and nglobal = 0.01. In this
case, we assume that a region can also benefit from its own contribution to the coalitional
spillovers not as in the case of internal coalitional spillovers, and that outsiders can get
some ratio of spillovers from the coalition. Following Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), we
assume that the diffusion rate among coalitions is larger than the one towards outsiders.
3 Results
As we cannot properly estimate the values of different n; our analysis of the results focuses
on the impact of varying levels of spillovers on stability of climate coalitions (Sect. 4), and
Table 1 State of technology based on emission intensity
Year USA JPN EU15 OOE EET FSU EEX CHN IND DAE BRA ROW
2011 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
2060 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04
2110 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.08
Note: The state of technology is based on the inverse of BAU emissions over GDP for each region (ton/
US1000$) and we scale the state of technology such that the global state of technology equals 1 in 2110
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a comparison of different specifications (Sect. 5). Nonetheless, it is instructive to start with
an analysis of the stability for all 4,084 coalition structures for the five scenarios.
In order to improve comparison of the results across scenarios, we need normalisation as
larger technology spillovers imply larger NPV of payoffs (through lower abatement costs).
We calculate the percentage of the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons that is
closed by a coalition, which can be interpreted as a normalised indicator of success of the
coalition.6 Table 2 shows the best-performing stable coalitions in all scenarios of technology
spillovers, the associated NPV of global payoffs in billion dollars and the associated indicator
of success. We obtain 185 stable coalitions in the cases of no spillovers and internal spillovers,
and 182 stable coalitions in the case of global spillovers. Clearly, global spillovers lead to
higher absolute payoffs than no spillovers and internal spillovers for any given coalition
structure. While marginal abatement costs are lower and payoffs are higher in the presence of
technology spillovers, the incentives to join or leave a coalition are not significantly influ-
enced. The best performing coalition, in terms of global payoff and indicator of success, is
formed by the USA, EET, CHN, IND and DAE. While absolute payoffs increase with global
spillovers, the indicator of success remains virtually unchanged: the spillovers affect all
coalitions and also the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons. As the incentives to
change membership depend on a comparison of different coalitions, the absolute values are
much less important than the relative differences. The indicator of success shows that these
relative differences hardly change, which implies that the incentives to change membership
hardly change. A first conclusion can therefore be that internal and global technology spill-
overs are not successful instruments to enhance the stability of climate coalitions.
Under coalitional spillovers, where coalition members benefit from partners through
technology spillovers, we have 193 stable coalitions. There are two mechanisms at work here.
First, the indicator of success for any given coalition is lower than in the case of no, internal
and global spillovers (although absolute payoffs are higher). This is due to the fact that the rate
of technology spillovers depends on the coalition formation and these spillovers work best in
the Grand Coalition, i.e. they increase the gap between the Grand Coalition and All Sin-
gletons. Second, new coalitions stabilise that are more ambitious, in this case, the coalition of
USA, EET, EEX, CHN and IND. That these two mechanisms counteract each other is
confirmed by the small decrease in the average indicator of success.
In the case of extended spillovers, global payoffs and the associated indicator of success are
slightly higher than in the case of coalitional spillovers. The reason is that the spillovers to
outsiders are not reflected in the Grand Coalition; therefore, the gap between the NPV of global
payoffs in Grand Coalition and in All Singletons is the same for coalitional spillovers and
extended spillovers, while the NPV of global payoffs for any given coalition is larger in the case
of extended spillovers as singletons can benefit from the spillovers generated by the coalition
members. In our setting, however, the extended spillovers are not sufficiently strong to sub-
stantially alter the set of stable coalitions. We will investigate this finding in more detail in Sect. 4.
In the coalitional and extended spillover scenarios, the number of stable coalition increases
and new stable coalition between USA, EET, EEX, CHN and IND emerges, which ranks first.
That the stable coalition consisting of six regions between USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE and
BRA does not rank in the top five shows that the size of the coalition does not necessarily
dictate the ambition level of the coalition: in the setting with heterogeneous regions, a small
coalition of ‘key players’ may be more successful than a large coalition.
6 The indicator of success for a coalition is calculated as the difference between the NPV of global payoff
when a coalition is formed and in All Singletons divided by the difference between the NPV of global payoff
in the Grand Coalition and in All Singletons.
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For these five scenarios, we can conclude that only moderately small stable coalitions
emerge, which close the gap between the Grand Coalition and All Singletons by less than
50%. Furthermore, while coalitional spillovers do increase payoffs and stabilise somewhat
more ambitious coalitions, they also increase the gap between Grand Coalition and All
Singletons, making the indicator of success smaller.
In the fourth and fifth scenarios, the coalition is assumed to be able to control the
technology spillovers, albeit only partially in the extended spillover case. This setting can
be interpreted as a model in which the public good (abatement) is coupled with a club good
(technological knowledge; for details on club goods, see Sandler and Tschirhart 1997). The
provision of the public good is affected by the presence of the club good. In our setting, the
coalition may be able to control which regions share in the club good, but it does not
deliberately choose the level of provision of the club good: it is not an independent choice
variable. This is due to our assumption that spillovers are linked to the exogenous state of
technology of the coalition members. Thus, the public good game does not affect the
provision of the club good for any given coalition. Still, the model does of course capture
the effect that when more regions join the coalition, both the level of abatement (the public
good) and the level of technology spillovers (the club good) increase.
4 Disentangling the impact of coalitional spillovers
As shown in the previous section, coalition spillovers can enhance stability to some extent,
although the indicator of success is lower than in the other scenarios. To understand the
main elements that stabilise the coalition, we address the following questions: Does the
magnitude of the technology spillovers created by the coalition (the ‘level effect’) matter?
Does the relative rate of the coalitional spillovers between the coalition members and
outsiders (the ‘asymmetry effect’) influence the success of climate coalitions? In order to
explore the main driving forces, we explore these two questions by varying the level of
coalitional and extended spillovers in Sect. 4.1 and by varying the ratio between coalitional
and extended spillovers in Sect. 4.2. We consider the case of extended spillovers examined
in Sect. 3 as the ‘base case’ in the following sections.
4.1 Analysis of the impact of the level effect
In the first analysis, we explore the level effect on the stability of coalitions by increasing
the magnitude of the coefficient of coalitional and extended technology spillovers. We
examine the stability of all coalitions using different values of coalitional spillovers to
coalitional members (nCÞ and to outsiders (nNCÞ; moving from 0.005 to 0.05 for coalition
members and from 0.001 to 0.01 for outsiders in five steps, while the ratio of the coalitional
spillovers to coalitional members over spillovers to outsiders remains the same.
The results of these calculations are summarised in Table 3, which shows the NPV of
global payoffs and associated indicator of success for the best-performing stable coalitions.
The results show that the best-performing stable coalitions substantially change with the
magnitude of spillovers. It is likely that Brazil and Japan, who have higher marginal
abatement costs, have incentives to join the coalition as spillovers increase. For example,
the coalition of EU15, EET, CHN, IND and DAE, which ranks fourth in the base case
model, is not stable anymore as spillovers increase, whereas these regions complemented by
Brazil form a new stable coalition. In line with the analysis in Sect. 3, the indicator of
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success for each stable coalition decreases with higher spillovers, as is clearly shown in
Table 3. Higher spillovers imply higher global payoffs in the Grand Coalition, while the
global payoff in the All Singletons remains the same across all spillover levels. This
difference is so large that the indicator of success decreases substantially with increasing
spillovers for a given stable coalition. The conclusion can be drawn that larger spillovers
tend to increase the size of stable coalition (up to seven members), and largely change the
structure of the stable coalitions, but the level effect may not have large effects on the
indicator of success.
4.2 Analysis of the impact of the asymmetry effect
In the second analysis, we focus on the effects of the relative rate of the coalitional spillovers
between the coalition members in comparison to spillovers to outsiders on the stability of
coalitions. We explore this asymmetry effect in two ways. First, we increase the coefficient
of coalitional spillovers to outsiders in four steps while keeping those to coalition members
the same as in the base case. Second, we increase the coefficient of coalitional spillovers to
coalition members while those to outsiders remain the same. We suspect that larger asym-
metry between technology spillovers among signatories versus outsiders may enhance larger
stable coalitions. The larger spillovers induce signatories to stay in the coalition, and thus
additional internally stable coalitions are expected to emerge. The large coalitional spill-
overs attract potential new entrants because coalition members can get higher benefits from
increased abatement by reducing emissions at lower costs than in the base model.
Table 4a shows the results of the asymmetry effects when the coefficient of coalitional
spillovers to outsiders increases. The results suggest that the four best-performing stable
coalitions remain the same, regardless of the level of extended spillovers. Thus, while the
numbers change slightly, the table clearly shows that the asymmetry effect is of little
importance for the stability of climate coalitions.7
Table 4b presents the results of the asymmetry effect when the coalitional spillovers
increase, keeping the extended spillovers constant (thereby making the wedge between
both larger). The table largely combines the insights from Tables 3 and 4a: the level effect
dominates the asymmetry effect, and thus, Table 4b looks very similar to Table 3. While
the level effect does stabilise larger (although not necessarily more ambitious) coalitions,
as it increases the gap between Grand Coalition and All Singletons, the indicator of success
does not increase with increasing spillovers. Again, we can draw the conclusion that the
asymmetry effect is of minor importance. The main explanation for the limited importance
of the asymmetry effect is that for the stability of climate coalitions, internal stability (i.e.
no coalition member wants to leave the coalition) is a much more important condition than
external stability (i.e. no outsider wants to join the coalition): increasing coalitional
spillovers can be associated with increasing the internal stability (to some extent at
the expense of weakening external stability), as they increase the surplus generated by the
coalition. Spillovers to outsiders have a more complicated impact, as they increase the
incentives to free-ride (and thus increase external stability and reduce internal stability),
but they also imply higher global abatement levels and thus increase payoffs for coalition
members as well. Furthermore, if an outsider decides to join the coalition, its membership
will increase the technology spillovers created by the enlarged coalition, again leading to
higher benefits for the region itself and for other regions. Consequently, these effects
7 This conclusion may not hold for much larger values of the extended spillovers, but we feel that much
higher values would not be realistic.
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mitigate each other and the result emerges that increasing spillovers to outsiders does
increase abatement levels and payoffs but does not stabilise larger coalitions.
5 Alternative specifications and sensitivity analysis
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we simulate various alternative
specifications of technology spillovers by (i) varying the aggregation of technology, (ii)
using different indicators for the state of technology and (iii) changing the impact of
spillovers on the MAC curve. In addition, as we believe that a crucial parameter in the
model is the discount rate r, this is subjected to a sensitivity analysis. For ease of com-
parison, we use the base model with extended spillovers as the reference case. Table 5a
presents the results of the alternative specifications and the sensitivity analysis on the
discount rate; these results will be discussed in the next sections.
5.1 Alternative aggregation of technology
In the simulations above, the assumption is that knowledge (‘state of technology’ in our
terminology) can be summed over regions to identify the size of the spillovers. According
to Sandler (2006), however, ‘Knowledge is the quintessential best-shot or better shot public
good, where breakthroughs come from concentrating effort and building up research
centers of excellence’. Therefore, we can construct an alternative spillover formulation
where we follow Sandler’s definition and define spillovers through a best-shot aggregation
of technology. The implication of the best-shot aggregation (Hirshleifer 1983; Sandler
2006) is that the technology spillovers depend on the maximum state of technology in a
coalition, rather than the sum of technologies. In the field of GHG abatement technologies,
the rationale for the best-shot aggregation is that the technologies that regions have to
reduce emissions will have substantial (or even full) overlap with the technologies in other
regions. Consequently, the region with the highest state of technology will not learn from
others. In this section, we explore the effects of best-shot aggregation on the stability of
coalitions under the internal and extended coalitional spillovers. To reflect a region’s
capability of adopting advanced technology, we modify the spillover specification in Eq. 4
such that the spillover depends on the difference between the highest state of technology
and the region’s own state of technology. Hence, the spillovers8 can be defined as follows:
1it ¼ nC  max
j2K
ðSoTj;tÞ  SoTi;t
 
þ nglobal  max
j2N
ðSoTj;tÞ  SoTi;t
 
8i 2 K;
1it ¼ nNC  max
j2K
ðSoTj;tÞ  SoTi;t
 
þ nglobal  max
j2N
ðSoTj;tÞ  SoTi;t
 
8i 62 K:
8
>><
>>:
ð5Þ
The ‘Best-shot’ column in Table 5a shows the NPV of global payoffs for the best-
performing stable coalitions with the best-shot technology aggregation (assuming extended
coalitional spillovers). We can observe that the five best-performing stable coalitions
remain the same but the indicators of success for these coalitions are slightly higher than in
the base model, which can be explained by the fact that the level of spillovers is somewhat
smaller than in our base case. The results suggest that the aggregation method does not
change the qualitative outcomes of the analysis.
8 All spillover coefficients are unchanged, and in the best-shot aggregation, we rescale the SoTs such that
the maximum SoT equals 1 in 2110.
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5.2 Alternative indicators for state of technology
In this section, we consider alternative indicators for state of technology, using energy
intensity or carbon intensity instead of emission intensity. Energy intensity is calculated as
energy use9 per unit of GDP, whereas carbon intensity is calculated as the amount of CO2
emitted per unit of energy. Emission intensity is used among others by Carraro and Sin-
iscalco (1997), while Kemfert (2004) uses energy intensity. The fourth and fifth columns in
Table 5a show the best-performing stable coalitions with these alternative indicators of
state of technology. With the state of technology based on energy intensity, we obtain the
same five best-performing stable coalitions as in the base case. This is because the regional
trends of energy intensity are similar to the trends of the emissions-output ratio. In contrast,
with the state of technology based on carbon intensity, most of the stable coalitions are the
same but additionally other stable coalitions emerge. In our model, emission and energy
intensities decrease over time, but this is not the case with carbon intensity. This shows that
while emission intensity and energy intensity are more or less interchangeable as an
indicator of the state of technology in addressing climate change, carbon intensity is a very
different indicator, which leads to different stable coalitions.
5.3 Alternative levels of spillovers on the MAC curve
The effect of technology spillovers (and learning) on the shape of the marginal abatement
cost (MAC) curve is hardly ever subjected to a thorough analysis, even though suspicion of
the effect of technical change on marginal abatement costs was already put forward more
than 20 years ago by Downing and White (1986). Recently, two papers emerged, Baker
et al. (2008) and Bauman et al. (2008), which challenge the conventional assumption that
technological change will pivot the MAC curve down. Bauman et al. (2008) take up the
argumentation of Downing and White (1986) and show that in certain circumstances,
technological change may even increase marginal abatement costs. Baker et al. (2008)
review the literature and derive that different technology options will have a different
impact on marginal abatement costs. Following Baker et al. (2008), we adopt two alter-
natives to our base model: (i) technology spillovers will extend the MAC curve to the right,
and (ii) technology spillovers will affect the curvature of the MAC curve.
In model terms, this implies that we separate the effects of the spillovers on the two
parts of our MAC function (Eq. 3 in Sect. 2.3). In the base case, a spillover will reduce
both parameters a and b. We approximate an extension of the curve to the right as a
spillover effect that will only affect parameter a (to the same extent as in the base model),
leaving parameter b unchanged. This implies that the initial slope of the MAC curve is
unchanged, but the curvature is reduced. In the alternative with a changed curvature, we
assume that technology spillovers will reduce the initial slope of the MAC curve, but
increase the curvature (where we assume the effect is smaller but not insignificant). In
mathematical notation, we have:
Base model:
MACi;t  oACitoqit ¼ ai 
Yt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ
 !
 q2it þ bi 
Yt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ
 !
 qit
ð3Þ
9 The trajectory of final energy is based on the EPPA model (J. M. Reilly 2005, pers. comm.).
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Extension: MACi;t  oACitoqit ¼ ai 
Yt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ
 !
 q2it þ bi  qit ð6Þ
Change curvature:
MACi;t  oACitoqit ¼ ai 
Yt1
s¼2011
1 þ 0:1  1isð Þ
 !
 q2it þ bi 
Yt1
s¼2011
1  1isð Þ
 !
 qit ð7Þ
where P denotes the product over time.
The main results of these alternative specifications can be found in the sixth and seventh
columns of Table 5a. In the alternative specifications, the total spillover effect is somewhat
smaller than that in the base model (as the effect on b is missing, and the effect on a is reversed,
respectively), and as expected, the indicator of success for each coalition is generally larger
and the payoff smaller than in the base model. In the first alternative, the ranking of the best-
performing stable coalitions is unaffected. In the second alternative, the level of spillovers is
substantially smaller (as can be seen from the lower payoffs for a given coalition), and
consequently, the coalition that ranks first in the base model is not stable, but there are not
many other changes in the stability of coalitions. Thus, we conclude that while the impact of
the shape of the MAC curve cannot be ignored, the qualitative conclusions still hold.
5.4 Changing discount rate
We change the base value of the discount rate r from 2% to 3% and 1%, respectively,
reflecting a higher (lower) rate of time preference. As shown in the eighth and ninth columns
of Table 5a, increasing (decreasing) the value of r will decrease (increase) the NPV of global
payoffs as future benefits from abatement are valued lower (higher), but the set of best-
performing stable coalitions and the indicator of success for these coalitions remains largely
the same as the base case: the relative comparison between different coalitions, which is what
matters for stability analysis, is not substantially affected by the discount rate.
5.5 Alternative transfer schemes
The purpose of this section is to explore to what extent our finding of very limited
asymmetry effects is influenced by the adopted type of transfer scheme, by comparing
coalitional spillovers (i.e. no spillovers to outsiders) with full spillovers to outsiders (i.e.
equal to spillovers to coalition members. Table 5b shows that the best-performing stable
coalitions vary with the type of transfer scheme (conform to the expectations and earlier
results for a setting without spillovers reported in Nagashima et al. 2006). The results also
show that the asymmetry effect does not matter for which coalition emerges as best-
performing, given the transfer schemes. There is a tendency that less efficient transfer
schemes imply a larger positive effect of spillovers to outsiders, but this is because less
efficient transfer schemes imply smaller and less ambitious stable coalitions, and thus a
larger number of outsiders. Thus, we can conclude that the conclusion on the limited
asymmetry effect is not directly related to the choice of transfer scheme.
6 Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we explore the effects of technology spillovers among heterogeneous regions
on the stability of possible climate coalitions with optimal transfer scheme. We identify
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technology spillovers through three major channels, and investigate how technology
spillovers can influence the region’s incentive structure to join the coalition. It should be
noted that we leave the issues of a separate technology agreement and endogenous learning
effects for further analysis; thus, the spillovers we investigate are exogenous. For future
research, it will also be worthwhile to examine endogenous feedback effects from abate-
ment on the state of technology and the impacts on the stability of climate coalitions.
Our main finding is that while global and coalitional spillovers can generate higher
payoffs and boost global abatement levels, technology spillovers do not substantially
increase the success of international climate agreements.
By and large, technology spillovers exclusive to coalitional members do increase their
incentive to stay in the coalition and their efforts to reduce emissions, which leads to increased
stability. However, as the gap between full cooperation (the Grand Coalition) and no cooperation
(All Singletons) also increases with the size of coalitional spillovers, the relative success of a
coalition, measured in terms of the percentage of the gap between Grand Coalition and All
Singletons that is closed by the coalition, mostly decreases with the level of coalitional spillovers.
Furthermore, spillovers to outsiders have a mixed influence on the incentives to free-
ride, and thus the set of stable coalitions remains largely unchanged. This also leads to the
surprising finding that the ratio (asymmetry) between spillovers to coalition members and
to outsiders is hardly important for the stability of coalitions. Thus, the analysis in this
paper shows that spillovers between coalition members may be much less effective in
overcoming the strong free-rider incentives that prevail in the international climate
negotiations than is commonly assumed.
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Appendix
Table A1 Global parameters
Symbol Description Value Unit Source
M Pre-industrial level of CO2 stock 590 GtC Nordhaus (1994)
d Natural annual removal rate of CO2 stock 0.00866 – Nordhaus (1994)
x Airborne fraction of emissions remaining
in the atmosphere
0.64 – Nordhaus (1994)
r Discount rate 0.02 – Assumption
hi Share of region i in global benefits See Table A2,
column 3
Own calculation based on
Fankhauser (1995)
ai Abatement cost parameter of region i See Table A2,
column 4
Own calculation based on
Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
bi Abatement cost parameter of region i See Table A2,
column 5
Own calculation based on
Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
cD Scale parameter of damage and benefit
function
0.027 – Tol (1997)
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Table A2 Regional parameters in the benefit and abatement cost function
Regions Emission
in 2010
Share of global
benefits
Parameter
of abatement cost
Parameter
of abatement cost
GtC (share) hi ai bi
USA 1.763 (0.238) 0.226 0.0005 0.0398
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 0.173 0.0155 1.8160
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 0.236 0.0024 0.1503
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 0.035 0.0083 0
EET 0.226 (0.030) 0.013 0.0079 0.0486
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 0.068 0.0023 0.0042
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 0.030 0.0032 0.3029
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 0.062 0.00007 0.0239
IND 0.344 (0.046) 0.050 0.0015 0.0787
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 0.025 0.0047 0.3774
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 0.015 0.5612 8.4974
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 0.068 0.0021 0.0805
World 7.425
P¼ 1ð Þ P hi ¼ 1ð Þ
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 2110
Gt
C
USA CHN EU15 ROW FSU IND
OOE EEX JPN DAE EET BRA
Fig. A1 Regional BAU emission paths. Source: Own calculations based on projections from the
MIT-EPPA model (J. M. Reilly 2005, pers. comm.)
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